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Abstract—Scalable routing schemes for large-scale networks,
especially future Internet, are required. Geometric routing
scheme is a promising candidate to solve the scalability issue of
routing tables in conventional IP routing based on longest prefix
matching. In this scheme, network nodes are assigned virtual co-
ordinates and packets are forwarded towards their intended des-
tination following a distance-decreasing policy. Dynamics in the
network such as node/link failures might affect this forwarding
and lead packets to a dead end. We proposed recovery techniques
in geometric routing to deliver packets to the destination in case of
failures. In this paper, we perform an analysis on the availability
of the proposed protection techniques on the Internet graph. The
routing scheme over optical transport network is considered and
the reliability data of physical components and a known network
availability model are used. This evaluation is compared with
the shortest cycle scheme which finds two node disjoint paths
between every source and destination in the topology and also
with geometric routing with no protection. The results show that
the proposed scheme performs reasonably well compared to the
shortest cycle scheme and significantly enhances the availability
compared to geometric routing without any protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to ever increasing throughput demands, IP prefix
lookup is becoming a bottleneck in future Internet. Higher
performance, capacity and forwarding rates are required in
order to meet the future demands. The growth of the size of
the routing tables is another issue which limits the scalability
of the current IP-based routing protocols. BGP is the protocol
used to exchange routing and reachability information between
Autonomous Systems (AS) in the Internet ([1] reports more
than 400K FIB entries in current BGP routers). Geometric
routing has been proposed to solve the issue of scalability in
routing tables and can be considered as an alternative to BGP
to route between ASes (Inter-AS).
In geometric routing, nodes are assigned virtual coordinates
and the forwarding is based on a distance-decreasing policy
[2]. This means that upon arrival of a packet in a node, the
distance of every neighboring node to the destination of the
packet is calculated and the one which decreases this distance
the most is selected as the next hop. Repeatedly applying this
policy will lead the packets to their intended destination. As
in every step, the neighbor with the most decreasing distance
is selected, the routing/forwarding is referred as greedy.
A problem with greedy forwarding is that packets might
reach a local minimum (dead end, void). This means that
the current node is closer to the destination than any of its
neighbors. Greedy embeddings are proposed to solve this issue
[3]. Greedy embeddings map network nodes to coordinates in
such a way that for every node there is always a distance
decreasing neighbor towards any other node in the network.
Greedy routing based on these embeddings guarantees the
delivery of the packets to every destination. In [4], we proposed
a simple but promising greedy embedding based on a spanning
tree of the network. In this scheme, every node is assigned a
label (coordinate) indicating the path from the root of the tree
to the node.
As the embedding is derived from a spanning tree of the
network, a change in the connectivity of the tree (component
failures) might affect the embedding and might lead the packets
to local minima. Therefore, recovery techniques are required to
provide resiliency against failures in the network. In [4] and
[5], we proposed protection techniques in geometric routing
for link/node failures in the network. These works showed
the scalability of the proposed schemes in terms of resources.
As availability is an important performance assessment factor
for recovery schemes, the goal of this paper is to evaluate
the connection availability of the proposed single-failure re-
silient geometric routing on a large graph such as the AS-
level topology of the existing Internet (CAIDA [6]). In this
evaluation, geometric routing over optical transport network
is considered and the reliability characteristics of physical
components and a well-known availability model are used. In
order to have a realistic evaluation, a multi-layer model is used
in which recovery in different layers is considered. Therefore,
we evaluate the connection availability of geometric routing
as a network layer scheme with the assumption that links
are protected in lower layers. Having a fair comparison with
BGP is challenging because different factors such as routing
policies and AS business relationships affect the selection
of the paths. Therefore, we compare the availability of the
proposed scheme with shortest cycle scheme in which two
node disjoint paths between every source and destination in the
network are constructed. In this scheme, in case the working
path between two nodes is not available, the second node
disjoint shortest path is used as the protection path. To the
best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies related
to connection availability of geometric routing on the Internet
topology.
This evaluation gives an overview on: i) how well the pro-
posed recovery scheme performs compared to the node disjoint
shortest path alternative and ii) what is the maximum and
minimum connection availability that can be obtained using
the model proposed on the Internet topology. These studies are
essential especially for services with high availability demands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, work related to availability analysis in network, geo-
metric routing and recovery techniques are described. A short
description of the used greedy embedding and the protection
techniques is provided in Section III. Section IV explains basic
concepts related to reliability assessment. Section V presents
the evaluation of connection availability for different schemes
of single-failure resilient geometric routing, shortest cycle and
geometric routing with no protection. Future work is discussed
in Section VI and finally Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Availability analysis especially in wavelength division mul-
tiplexing (WDM) optical networks has received great attention
in recent years. Many works have proposed analytical models
for evaluating the connection availability in these networks
for single link failure scenarios [7], [8]. The main observation
in [7] was that a mesh network with single link failure
restorability is robust under dual-failure events. The authors
defined equivalent unavailability for a link which means that
the link is considered available if it is physically working or it
is physically down but transparently replaced by a restoration
path between its end nodes. This is similar to the multi-layer
model we consider in the connection availability evaluation in
this paper. While evaluating the availability of routing scheme
in network layer, we assume that links are protected in lower
layers. In [8], different protection schemes, 1:1, 1:N and M:N
are considered. The focus of the paper is on path protection
strategy in which a backup path for each working path on an
end-to-end basis is provided. This is different from our work
as nodes are recovered locally and failing links are bypassed
by routing towards a hub node. In [9], the reliability analysis
on two link-disjoint paths in mesh network is studied. Using
two disjoint paths, 100% protection against a single failure is
provided and authors try to maximize the reliability regardless
of the number of link failures occurring on the network.
It is proved that this problem is NP-complete and heuristic
algorithms are proposed to find two link-disjoint paths with
maximum reliability. In this paper, we compare the connection
availability of the proposed schemes for geometric routing with
such an scheme in which two disjoint paths for every source
and destination in the topology are calculated.
In other works such as [10] analytical model for dual
link failure is proposed. In [11], authors proposed a hy-
brid scheme to achieve high connection availability with low
backup resources in double link failure scenario. The hybrid
scheme is based on backup re-provisioning, path restoration
and 1:1 dedicated path protection. They use ILP models
in their proposed scheme. In [12], a model for availability
evaluation of protected optical connections in WDM networks
employing M:N dedicated protection is proposed. The same
authors proposed an analytical model for availability evaluation
of WDM network with shared-link connections under multiple
link failures in [13]. The effect of topology properties on
connection availability in Generalized Multiprotocol Label
Switching (GMPLS) over optical transport networks is studied
in [14].
As geometric routing scheme suffers from packets reaching
local minima, many works have proposed greedy embeddings
in different metric spaces to avoid this issue. In [15] and [16],
authors proposed greedy embeddings in the hyperbolic plane.
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Fig. 1. Steps for tree-based greedy embedding.
Flury et al. proposed greedy embedding in Euclidean space
[17]. We proposed a greedy embedding based on a spanning
tree of the network in [4]. Dynamics in the topology such as
link/node failure might affect the greedy embeddings causing
the packets reaching local minima. Face routing techniques
pass the void by routing around this area and greedy routing is
resumed from the moment that a closer node to the destination
is reached [18]. The issue with these type of techniques is
that the graph should be planar/planarized which might not be
feasible for every graph. Authors in [19] proposed a dynamic
greedy embedding to deal with node additions to the network
topology. However, in order to deal with network failures a
path trace is maintained in packets in order to avoid loops
which imposes a large overhead to packets headers [4]. We
proposed different protection techniques for link/node failures
which avoid coordinate re-calculations and are based on greedy
forwarding [4], [5]. The proposed schemes are scalable with
low overhead to the network nodes and packets headers.
In this paper, we consider the tree-based greedy embedding
as proposed in [4] and evaluate connection availability of
geometric routing with the proposed protection schemes in [4]
and [5] over optical transport network in the Internet topology.
III. GREEDY GEOMETRIC ROUTING
In this section, we briefly explain the tree-based greedy
embedding and the protection techniques on which the avail-
ability analysis is performed. For more details on the schemes,
we refer the interested readers to [4] and [5].
A. Tree-based greedy embedding
Rather than relying on complex (e.g. hyperbolic) geometry,
in [4] we used tree-based coordinates for greedy forwarding.
This will reduce the computational overhead and complexity
of the overall scheme. Steps for calculating the labeling based
on a spanning tree of the network are as follows:
1) First a rooted spanning tree of the network is gener-
ated.
2) The root node sets its coordinate vector (CV) to zero.
3) Each node numbers its children from 1 to d (d is the
number of children).
4) A node can calculate the coordinates of its children
by adding the number assigned to each child after the
last non-zero coordinate in its own CV.
Figure 1 depicts an example for this embedding. Once
every node has its deduced CV using the above procedure,
packets can be forwarded towards neighboring nodes which
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Fig. 2. Example for upward failure scenario.
(maximally) reduce the distance towards the CV of the desti-
nation node mentioned in the received packet. In this context,
tree-distance is used as the metric which is the hop count on
the tree between two nodes.
B. Single failure protection techniques
In [5], we proposed protection techniques for geometric
routing which are only used for tree edge failures. The reason
is that in greedy routing based on a spanning tree, in case
of a shortcut1 failure, there is still a distance-decreasing path
available via the tree. However, a tree edge failure might affect
the greedy embedding causing the packets to reach a local
minimum.
In this scheme, we distinguish between upward and down-
ward failures. In upward failures, packets should have passed
the failing link to get closer to the root of the tree while in
downward failures, packets go deeper in the tree.
For every tree edge attached to a node, a search is per-
formed in order to find an intermediate node (hub node) from
which greedy routing to the destination is possible (considering
that edge to be failing). In a downward failure scenario, we
look for a hub node which has a shortcut to the subtree below
the failing link. In an upward failure scenario, it is enough that
the hub node has a shortcut to a node out of the subtree below
the failing link. The forwarding process in case of a failure is
as follows:
1) Greedy route from failure detecting node to hub node.
2) Take the shortcut to go to the desired subtree.
3) Continue greedy routing to the destination on the tree.
Figures 2 and 3 depict examples for the two explained
failure scenarios. The primary greedy path is depicted with
solid line on the left and the secondary path after recovery
is depicted with dot line on the right. The corresponding hub
node for the depicted failing tree edge is colored grey.
We proposed a protection technique for node failure in [4].
In this scheme, every node finds disjoint backup paths to the
nodes two hops away. In case of a node failure, a disjoint
backup path is used to bypass the failing node and greedy
routing is resumed once the two-hops away node is reached.
We refer the interested readers to [4] and [5] for more
details on the exchanged messages, augmentation to the packet
headers and the overhead added to the network nodes.
1A link which is not in the spanning tree of the network.
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Fig. 3. Example for downward failure scenario.
IV. PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
In this section, we explain the reliability performance
parameters which are used for the evaluation of the protection
techniques for single failure in geometric routing.
A. Component availability
Availability of a component is defined as the probability
that the component is functional at any arbitrary moment.
It can be expressed by the components mean time to repair
(MTTR) and the mean time between failures (MTBF). MTTR
is defined as the required time for the restoration of the
component and MTBF is the time between two consecutive
failures of the component [20]. The availability A is:
A = 1−
MTTR
MTBF
(1)
B. Protected/Unprotected connection availability
The availability of a connection in a network is calculated
using the availability of the components (nodes/links) in the
network. In an unprotected connection, all the nodes and
links/lines along the path of the connection should be available
in order to have availability for the connection. Therefore, the
availability is defined as:
Aunprotected =
∏
Ai (2)
Ai is the availability of the ith component (node or link)
along the path.
As mentioned earlier, recovery schemes enhance the avail-
ability of the connection. A protected connection is available
if the working path or the protection path of the connection is
available.
Aprotected = Aw +A
′
wAp (3)
Aw and A
′
w are the availability and unavailability of the
working path respectively. Ap is the availability of the pro-
tection path. This formula can be extended for the availability
of a system, Asystem, with more than one connection and
considering single failure:
Asystem =
M∏
i=1
Awi +
M∑
j=1


M∏
k=1;k 6=j
Awk

A′wjApj (4)
M is the number of working connections in the system.
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Fig. 4. Example of a bidirectional line [20].
C. Network availability model
In the network availability model considered in this paper,
a node is composed of one Optical cross connect (OXC).
A bidirectional line which connects two optical nodes is
composed of a series of components such as pieces of physical
cable, a number of optical amplifiers (OA) and a line system
at each side of the line (Figure 4). This line is available
only if all the components are available. Assuming statistically
independent failures, the availability of a bidirectional line is
defined as:
Aline = Acable ×A
N
OA ×A
2
line−system (5)
N is the number of OAs which is dependent on the length of
the line (assuming an OA every 100 Km) [20].
The MTTR and MTBF of physical components reported in
[20] are used in formula (1) to obtain the availability of single
components in the network.
We evaluate the connection availability of geometric rout-
ing over optical transport network for every possible source-
destination pair in the topology based on the reliability charac-
teristics of the physical components and the connection model
in formula (3). In order to obtain a more realistic evaluation,
we consider a multi-layer model. This means that although
the proposed protection scheme is provided for network layer
(L3), in the availability evaluation of the connections, links in
the topology are considered to be protected in lower layers
(L2/L1).
Note that in the proposed protection scheme, in a connec-
tion, depending on the link/node which is failing, different
backup paths might be used. Therefore, in order to evaluate
the availability of a connection, every possible single failure
along the connection path is considered and the availability
of the corresponding backup path is evaluated and the sum of
all represents the protected connection availability. Consider
Figure 5 as a case study. In this example, only link failure
is considered. Each of the graphs in this figure depicts a
single link failure scenario along the connection 7-3-1 and
the corresponding protection path is illustrated by a dot arrow.
The availability of the connection 7-1 is calculated as follows:
Aconnection7−1 = A7−3A3−1 +A
′
7−3A7−2A2−1+
A
′
3−1A7−3A3−6A6−5A5−2A2−1
(6)
V. RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF
CONNECTIONS
In this section, we evaluate the connection availability of
the Internet topology for different schemes: i) tree-based geo-
metric routing with no protection and ii) tree-based geometric
1
32
5 6 74
D
S
1
32
5 6 74
D
S
Fig. 5. Example for evaluation of connection availability.
routing with single link/node failure protection technique. In
all schemes, we assume that links are protected in lower
layers (L2/L1). Having a fair comparison with BGP is a
challenging task because in BGP different factors such as
AS relationships and routing policies affect the path selection.
Therefore, we compare the schemes with another alternative in
which the shortest cycle between every source and destination
is calculated. In this scheme, in case of the unavailability of
the working path, the second node disjoint shortest path is used
as the protection path.
First, we explain our simulation methodology and how
we modeled the Internet topology and then we report the
numerical results.
A. Methodology for simulation approach
The general steps in our simulation are as follows:
1) Given a topology, the tree-based coordinates as ex-
plained in Section III are assigned to the network
nodes.
2) The hub node corresponding to every tree edge and
the disjoint backup paths for nodes are calculated as
explained in Section III.
For every possible connection in the network (every possible
source-destination pair):
1) The path produced by greedy geometric routing is
determined.
2) The availability of the unprotected connection is
calculated based on formula (2).
3) Components (link/node) along the path are consid-
ered failing, one at a time, the protecting path cor-
responding to that failure is calculated based on the
proposed protection technique and the availability of
the connection is calculated as explained in Section
IV.
In the availability evaluation of the scheme based on
shortest cycle, as for any failure in the working path, the same
backup path is used, we directly apply formula (3).
B. Internet topology
As mentioned earlier, geometric routing is considered as an
alternative to BGP to route between ASes in the Internet (inter-
AS routing). Therefore, we perform our availability analysis on
an AS-level graph of CAIDA which represents the topology of
the Internet at the level of ASes. Figure 6 visualizes CAIDA’s
AS-level Internet graph in January 2013. Due to resource
Fig. 6. CAIDA’s AS-level Internet graph. http://www.caida.org
limitation in the simulation environment, we select the CAIDA
network which consists out of 16301 ASes and 27646 links
[6]. For this network, the average shortest path is 3.77, the
minimum node degree is 1 and the maximum node degree is
2331.
One of the major challenges in this analysis is to achieve
a network model based on the existing data for the Internet
topology. In the following, we explain how these challenges
are tackled and what assumptions are made.
In CAIDA AS-level graph, nodes represent ASes and
links represent peering relationships. No more data regarding
the geolocations and the distances between different ASes is
provided. In order to evaluate the connection availability on the
CAIDA topology, we require some estimation on the physical
distance between adjacent nodes in the network (required for
line availability evaluation in formula (5)). To this end, we used
two different data bases2: i) GeoLite ASN which provides the
IP addresses to AS numbers mapping and ii) GeoLite City
which provides IP addresses to geolocations mapping. Using
these databases, we extract the approximate location of each
node in CAIDA topology. Assuming that each AS consists
of one border router (due to lack of more information), the
extracted locations represent the geolocation of such routers.
The border router of an AS is assumed to be directly connected
to the border routers of adjacent ASes. Therefore, the physical
distance between connected routers is calculated based on their
geolocations. These border routers perform geometric routing
to route between ASes.
The first challenge was that the databases could not provide
geographic location for almost 10% of the nodes in the
network. Therefore, in order to estimate the location of them
we used the locations of the adjacent nodes. Based on the
locations of the neighboring nodes, the geolocation of the
center point is calculated and is assigned to the node without
any location. This way, we could estimate the locations of the
majority of the nodes with missing locations.
The next challenge was that this process could not be used
for the leaf nodes (nodes with only one neighbor). Therefore,
in such scenarios we used another process to complete our
model.
Consider a leaf node with missing location which has a
2http://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/legacy/geolite/
Fig. 7. Histogram of the distances of the adjacent nodes in the CAIDA
topology. For better visualization, the inset illustrates the histogram of the
range 0-5000 Km.
TABLE I. MTTR AND MTBF VALUES FOR OAS AND WDM LINE
SYSTEMS.
MTBF(hours) MTTR(hours)
Bidirectional OA 5× 105 24
Bidirectional WDM Line system 5× 105 6
parent with known location. First we calculate the surface that
can be covered by the parent node. This can be calculated
based on the locations of other adjacent nodes to the parent.
We only consider adjacent nodes with the distance between
50 and 1000 Km. We assume that nodes within the range of
50 Km cover the same area and above 1000 Km are probably
not connected directly. Having this in mind, the radius of the
surface that the parent node can cover is calculated as half of
the average distance of the considered neighbors. If we assume
that the leaf nodes are distributed uniformly in the covered area
by the parent, half of the calculated radius can be considered
as the upper bound for the distance of a leaf node to the parent.
Note that in practice, ASes might be connected to each
other through Internet Exchange Points (IXP), however, in an
AS-level topology such as CAIDA, these ASes are considered
to be adjacent (an edge in the graph). This is a limitation of the
model, as it considers a direct physical link between adjacent
nodes in the AS-level topology.
Figure 7 depicts the distribution of the distances calculated
for the adjacent nodes in the CAIDA network. As we see,
a large percentage of distances are in the range of 10 to
5000 Km. Due to the incompleteness of the databases and
the limitation of the model, a few distances reach 20K Km.
The average of the calculated distances is 2461.23 Km.
Using the calculated distances and formula (5) in Section
IV, we evaluated the availability of the links/lines in the
CAIDA network and Figure 8 depicts the distribution of
TABLE II. CABLE CUT AND MTBF VALUES FOR FIBEROPTIC CABLE.
Cable Cut-CC (km) MTTR(hours)
Terrestrial Fiberoptic Cable 450 24
Fig. 8. Histogram of the line/link availability in the CAIDA topology. The
inset illustrates the histogram of the range 0.98-1.
TABLE III. PERCENTILE AND AVERAGE VALUES FOR LINE
AVAILABILITY (A) IN THE CAIDA TOPOLOGY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF
THE PROTECTED LINKS (A-P). (A-L) REPRESENTS THE AVAILABILITY FOR
LINKS ATTACHED TO THE LEAF NODES.
Min. 25 50 75 Max. Average
A 0.8787 0.9820 0.9925 0.9986 0.99999 0.985
A-P 0.9852 0.99967 0.99994 0.99999 0.99999 0.9993
A-L 0.9852 0.99986 0.99999 0.99999 0.99999 0.99965
the calculated values. The percentile and the average value
of these availabilities are reported in Table III. The MTTR
and MTBF of different optical components are based on the
values proposed in [20] and are reported in Tables I and
II. Considering the availability model of a bidirectional line
(formula (5)), fiber optic cable is the dominant component in
this model because the cable cuts are frequent and repair times
are very long. Therefore, the availability of a line is dependent
on its length. Observing the calculated line availabilities, the
low minimum availability of 0.8787 can be explained because
of the large distances (20K Km) between some nodes. Based
on these results, up to 75 percentile of the line availabilities
are below 0.999.
Due to these large distances (low line availability) in
order to have a realistic evaluation, the multi-layer model
is considered in which links are assumed to be protected in
lower layers (L2/L1). The percentile and the average value
for availability of the protected lines are reported in Table
III. We observe a significant enhancement in the availability
of the lines compared to the values with no protection. The
minimum line availability is increased to 0.9852 and even the
25 percentile of the values is above 0.999.
C. Numerical results
Using the calculated line availabilities (with protection in
lower layers L2/L1), we evaluate the connections availability
using geometric routing in the CAIDA network based on
formula (3) and the explanations in Section IV. The node
availability is assumed to be 0.99994 which was proposed in
[20].
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Fig. 9. Histogram of the connection availability of geometric routing on
CAIDA topology without protection.
Note that in CAIDA topology, up to 30% of the nodes are
leaf nodes. As these nodes/attached links can not be protected
by the proposed protection scheme, their availability is limited
to the obtained line availability with protection in lower layers
(L1/L2). Table III reports the percentile of the availability of
the edges attached to the leaf nodes. As the protection schemes
do not enhance the availability of these edges, we report the
availability of the connections excluding the leaves.
We first evaluate the connection availability without any
recovery scheme and in the second experiment the protection
scheme is considered and the explained simulation methodol-
ogy is followed.
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the connections avail-
ability based on geometric routing in CAIDA network when
no recovery is considered (for all possible source-destination
pairs). For better visualization, the availability in the range
0.97-0.99985 is depicted however, the percentile and average
values are reported in Table IV. As mentioned earlier, length
of a link is the dominant factor in the availability of the link
and the availability of a connection is also dependent on the
length of the links. Therefore, availability of the connections
including the very long links can be negatively affected. The
low minimum value of 0.94202 can be explained because of
the estimation of very large distances for some adjacent nodes
in the network.
Figure 10 depicts the distribution of the connections avail-
ability with protection technique in geometric routing. We
observe how the availability is enhanced compared to the
previous scheme, when no recovery was used. The availability
in the range 0.99980-0.99988 is depicted and the percentile
and the average value are reported in Table IV. The minimum
availability is increased to 0.98 and the average value is 0.9998
which is a significant enhancement compared to no protection
scheme.
In the final scheme, as a comparison, we evaluate the
connection availability in an alternative scheme in which the
shortest cycle between every two nodes is calculated. Finding
0.99981 0.99983 0.99985 0.99987
Fig. 10. Histogram of the connection availability of geometric routing on
CAIDA topology with protection.
TABLE IV. PERCENTILE AND AVERAGE VALUES FOR CONNECTION
AVAILABILITY IN 3 SCHEMES :I) GEOMETRIC ROUTING WITHOUT
PROTECTION (G) II) GEOMETRIC ROUTING WITH PROTECTION (G-P) AND
III) SHORTEST CYCLE (SH)
Min 25 50 75 Max. Average
G 0.94202 0.99388 0.99600 0.99845 0.99985 0.99531
G-P 0.98516 0.99984 0.99986 0.99987 0.99988 0.99983
SH 0.94841 0.99997 0.99999 0.99999 0.99999 0.99987
the shortest cycle between two nodes in the topology boils
down to finding minimum-cost flow of 2 between the nodes.
Once the working path is unavailable, the second node-disjoint
shortest path is used as the protection path. Availability of a
connection is also dependent on the number of hop counts
in that connection. The comparison with the shortest cycle
scheme gives an overview on how the connection availability
is affected by the increase in the number of hop counts. Figure
11 illustrates the distribution of the connections availability for
the shortest cycle scheme. For better visualization, the values
in the range of 0.9998 and 0.99999 are depicted. The percentile
and the average values are reported in Table IV. An interesting
observation is that, the minimum availability obtained by this
scheme is much lower than the one achieved by the proposed
protection scheme in geometric routing. This can be explained
by the fact that for some connections in the topology, it
might not be feasible to find two node disjoint paths while
the proposed protection scheme is successful in finding an
alternate path. The average connection availability achieved
by both schemes are almost the same (0.9998). However, the
maximum availability of the shortest cycle reaches 0.99999
while in the geometric scheme it reaches 0.99988.
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
We calculated connection availability of geometric rout-
ing over optical transport network on the Internet topology.
Finding a reasonable model for the Internet topology was a
challenge due to the incompleteness of the available data. This
was tackled by using different databases and some estimations
on the geolocation of the nodes in the Internet graph.
As fiber optic cable is the dominant component in the
0.99996 0.99997 0.99998 0.99999 1.00000
Fig. 11. Histogram of the connection availability of shortest cycle scheme
on CAIDA topology.
availability model of network (frequency of the cuts and long
repair times), the availability of connections is dependent on
the distances of the adjacent nodes in the topology. Using
the explained Internet model, the length of the links in the
Internet topology ranges from 10 km to 20K km. Therefore, the
availability of connections including the links with large length
as 20K km are considerably negatively affected. The other
dominant factor in the connection availability is the hop counts
between source and destination of the connections. However,
the results in our prior work showed that the proposed pro-
tection schemes result into paths with length close to the
shortest path length. The experimental results showed that the
proposed scheme performs reasonably well compared to the
shortest cycle alternative. Although the maximum achievable
connection availability is higher in the shortest cycles, the
minimum availability achieved by the proposed protection is
much higher than the other scheme.
In large topologies such as Internet, the probability of
multiple failures is not negligible. In order to obtain higher
connection availability, protection against more failures should
be considered. An interesting direction for future work is to
evaluate the connection availability in geometric routing for
multiple failure scenarios. Using recovery schemes against
multiple failures should allow for high availability of up to
0.99999 as the ultimate goal.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered geometric routing as an
alternative to BGP to route between Autonomous Systems
(ASes) in the Internet. We used a simple and promising greedy
embedding based on a spanning tree of the network. As failures
in the network might affect the greedy embedding, recovery
techniques were considered to avoid packets reaching a dead
end. We performed an availability analysis of the protection
scheme for single failure in geometric routing on the Internet
topology. For this analysis, we used a network model for the
Internet topology which was challenging to achieve due to
the incompleteness of the existing data. The availability was
evaluated on a AS-level graph of CAIDA. In order to achieve a
realistic evaluation, we used a multi-layer model in which links
are protected in lower layers than network layer. The results
showed significant enhancement in the availability compared
to the scheme when no protection for the geometric routing
was considered. We compared our results with an existing
alternative in which the shortest cycle between the source
and the destination is calculated. An interesting observation
was that the minimum connection availability achieved by the
proposed scheme was much higher than the shortest cycle
scheme and the average connection availability obtained by
both schemes were almost the same.
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